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Deﬁnitions and Categories:
Epistemologies of Race and Critique
BRANWEN GRUFFYDD JONES
In a recent discussion of the multiple relationships between science and colonial-
ism, Suman Seth observed that ‘the history of almost all modern science, it has
become clear, must be understood as “science in a colonial context”’.1 Similarly
Palladino and Worboys noted that ‘for most of humanity, the history of science
and imperialism is the history of science’.2 Much the same could be said of
modern international thought. International Relations (IR) as a discipline, and
the discipline’s antecedents in (Western) international thought, were born into
and grew up in the context of European expansion, colonialism and imperialism.
This relation between content and context was not contingent but central to the
shaping of disciplinary knowledge. In this important book John Hobson docu-
ments in systematic detail the centrality of racial discourse to international
thought from the mid-eighteenth century and the continuing legacy of eurocentr-
ism underpinning much post-war IR scholarship into the twenty-ﬁrst century.
The relation between the colonial and imperial context and the content of
international thought frames the question of race in ways which demand critical
attention to questions of method. How and in what ways does a historical analysis
of racial thought matter, speciﬁcally in relation to international thought and prac-
tice? Hobson speciﬁes the focus of his study as Western international theory
between 1760 and 2010, ‘the last quarter millennium’.3 While enabling the
inclusion of strands of thought across a variety of positions, this delimitation
invites reﬂection on the periodization of racial thought, which is not straightfor-
ward. Treating ideas of race as a transhistorical phenomenon, various earlier scho-
lars traced such ideas far back to Ancient Greece, China and elsewhere.4 Others,
however, attending to both the geopolitical context and epistemological conditions
of possibility of changing ideas, identify modernity as the signiﬁcant context for
the emergence of modern racial discourses.5 Scholars have examined how and
why theories of ‘race’, in terms of an idea of distinct categories of human being,
emerged from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the context of the devel-
opment of new sciences and epistemological frameworks, especially natural
history and anatomy, while a discourse of race centred on the body only became
possible from the nineteenth century.6 Speciﬁcally with regard to IR, a strong
case has been made that it is the era of European expansion and colonialism,
from 1492 onwards, that must be acknowledged as the era of racialized inter-
national thought and practice.7 What matters in identifying this period is the use
of various ideas which distinguish between peoples on some basis of comparison
and hierarchy to legitimize differential modes of practice in relations within
Europe, and between European and non-European peoples and political entities.
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Siba Grovogui has argued that over this period Western thought ‘produced an
ontology of difference due to race. This ontology emerged during the Renaissance,
survived through the eighteenth-century Enlightenment debates on the nature of
the moral order, and spanned nineteenth-century scientiﬁc racism to the
present’.8 Accordingly, a deﬁning early moment which might mark the opening
of a new era of racialized international thought and practice was the issuing of
Papal Bulls along the ﬁfteenth century which authorized the enslavement of Afri-
cans by the Portuguese crown.9 The content and methods of racialized thought
were certainly reconﬁgured through the shifts from the renaissance to the classical
and modern epistemes, but the later epistemes reworked already existing strands of
racialized thought, in terms of discourses comparing peoples and specifying infer-
iority and superiority on the basis of various criteria of difference. Those criteria of
difference were reconﬁgured in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries
on the basis of new methods of enquiry and underlying rules regarding authorita-
tive knowledge and truth, new classiﬁcatory systems, new ideas about natural
history, and later on the basis speciﬁcally of the body, skin colour, brain size
and structure, and other corporal features. But across these eras, racialized
thought always combined various criteria including comparative evaluation of
culture, religion, social and political organization, language, appearance, intelli-
gence, morals, manners, ways of life and so on. Certainly, it was in part the histori-
cal shift to new epistemologies which enabled a scientiﬁc discourse of race to be
thought; it was also the broader colonial context.10 There is no easy and direct
mapping between ideas and images articulated by philosophers, jurists, travellers,
writers, scientists and artists, and the doctrines and practices of colonialism,
slavery, international trade and conquest. Nevertheless we should bear in mind
that the eighteenth century was simultaneously the era when the discourse of
race became consolidated on new authoritative grounds; when there was ‘a tremen-
dous increase in the slave trade and a proﬁtable trans-Atlantic economy which
involved most of the Western countries’, and when new ‘sagas of exploration’
took off.11
In The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics Hobson does not seek to
account for nor even particularly to contextualize the emergence and development
of international racial and eurocentric thought, however, but to reveal and docu-
ment its centrality and complexity. His analysis foregrounds the diversity and dis-
agreements within and between various strands of international, racial and imperial
thought, eschewing homogenizing generalizations. Hobson urges recognition of
the complexity of differing strands of racial international thought and the interests
and political projects reﬂected and endorsed by various positions with regards to
race. He underlines, for example, that there is no straightforward relation
between ideas about race and positions for or against imperialism. There were
racist pro-imperialists, racist anti-imperialists, anti-racist pro-imperialists and
anti-racist anti-imperialists. Hobson develops a series of distinctions in order to
clarify the similarities and differences across and between various thinkers, dis-
tinguishing positions which are paternalist eurocentric pro- or anti-imperialist;
racist imperialist (liberal or realist); racist anti-imperialist; anti-paternalist euro-
centric anti-imperialist. He also highlights differences within racial thought, for
example between those who believed the characteristics and capabilities of
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different races were ﬁxed, and those who believed that such characteristics were
‘malleable’ and could evolve or improve. He distinguishes between ‘uncompro-
mising eugenics’ and neo-Lamarckian social Darwinists, and between more and
less progressive Lamarckian positions with regard to colonial policy. Hobson
charts these distinctions across liberal, conservative, realist, socialist, radical and
paciﬁst positions and traditions of thought. Thus he underlines that many left lib-
erals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century embraced scientiﬁc racism,
reminding us, for example, that pillars of the British welfare state such as John
Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge were members of the Eugenics
Society. Among realist racist imperialists, Hobson distinguishes ‘indirect extermi-
nists’ from ‘direct exterminists’. He demonstrates that during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries arguments for or against war articulated by European
and North American writers and politicians were informed by widely varying pos-
itions regarding race. Hobson exposes the racial views of ﬁgures who will be fam-
iliar to many an IR student, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson,
while also demonstrating the strength of racial international thought in the work
of a range of other ﬁgures that few IR students would come across, precisely
because of the discipline’s denial of its origins in racial thought and imperial times.
Others have also foregrounded the complexity of intellectual and political pos-
itions regarding race, slavery and colonialism. Drescher, for example, provides
vivid evidence of changing and complicated positions on race, slavery and abol-
ition held by planters, abolitionists, ethnologists and humanitarians in Britain
and France from the 1780s to 1840s.12 It matters how we apprehend this ideational
complexity, precisely because of the relationship between ideas and practice and
the broader normalization of social and international orders. In his analysis of
the discipline of anthropology’s constitutive ethnocentrism, Valentin Mudimbe dis-
tinguishes two dimensions:
an epistemological ﬁliation and an ideological connection. In fact they are often complemen-
tary and inseparable. The ﬁrst is a link to an episteme, that is, an intellectual atmosphere which
gives to anthropology its status as discourse, its signiﬁcance as a discipline, and its credibility
as a science in the ﬁeld of human experience. The second is an intellectual and behavioural
attitude which varies among individuals. Basically this attitude is both a consequence and
an expression of a complex connection between the scholar’s projection of consciousness,
the scientiﬁc models of his time, and the cultural and social norms of his society.13
We might think of Hobson’s project as focusing on the second of these dimensions,
foregrounding and dissecting the variations of intellectual and behavioural attitude
and political position within the works of numerous individual thinkers concerned
with IR. In order to render manageable and bring clarity and precision to an analy-
sis of a vast array of texts, arguments and positions over more than two centuries,
Hobson develops a system of classiﬁcation through which he can specify the dis-
tinguishing attributes of various positions and texts, their similarities and contrasts.
What is curious is that though his own ideological connection is clear, and clearly
critical, Hobson’s methodological approach seems to be situated within the epis-
temological ﬁliation in which racial thought came to be constituted. That is, he
employs analytical methods which, in themselves, mirror the methods central to
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the consolidation of racial discourse at the beginning of the period that Hobson
examines.
Hobson identiﬁes four ‘generic variants’ of ‘Orientalist’ thought in international
theory, obtained by breaking down the concept of orientalism ‘into two component
parts—scientiﬁc racism and Eurocentric institutionalism—and then subdividing
these categories into their imperialist and anti-imperialist components’.14 The dis-
tinguishing criteria of these different variants are presented in summary form in a
four by four table which ‘reveals the four key dimensions of “generic” Eurocentr-
ism that existed in the period 1760–1945’.15 Hobson further distinguishes ‘a large
variety of positions’ within each of these four primary variants. 1945 is taken as a
turning point after which the ﬁrst variant of scientiﬁc racism ‘disappears from IR
theory’.16 The post-1945 period of international theory is categorized by differen-
tiating, within the remaining generic variant of Eurocentric institutionalism, ‘sub-
liminal’ from ‘manifest’ Eurocentrism; and further distinguishing between
orthodox or critical, and, as previously, imperialist or anti-imperialist positions.
This categorization provides the over-arching framework for the organization of
the book. Each chapter examines the work of a range of scholars and thinkers
whose views, arguments, attitudes and positions exemplify the category speciﬁed
in the chapter title—‘just enough thinkers to support my claim that in aggregate
they represent one type or genre of “Eurocentrism”, but not too many that the
depth of analysis is lost’17—thus overall providing a complex mapping of the var-
ieties, similarities, differences, contradictions and changes within racist and euro-
centric international thought over two and a half centuries.
This method, from the vocabulary of ‘generic variants’ to the use of visual
devices to bring order to the complexity of ideas, has uncanny parallels with the
method of classiﬁcation which emerged as a deﬁning feature of the scientiﬁc dis-
course of race from the eighteenth century. While European cosmographies of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries necessarily entailed some concern with identi-
fying differences between the societies described,18 the role of classiﬁcation took
on a new importance from the eighteenth century, as ideas about race came to be
reformulated on what was considered a scientiﬁc basis.
Fascination with collecting and compiling objects and knowledge had long
existed within Europe, manifest in the famous ‘cabinets of curiosity’, cosmogra-
phies and encyclopaedias.19 The convergence of these impulses is manifest in
the botanical garden, in which were contained collections of local and foreign
plants, gathered from voyages of collection and exploration near and far, and
which made possible the systematic study of plants by naturalists. This also, of
course, brings in the colonial context: it was through voyages of exploration and
colonial conquest that objects—plants, rocks, animals, people and artefacts—
were brought back to nourish the curiosity, quest for knowledge and proﬁts of
European scholars, statesmen and traders.20 Thus the botanical garden was soon
followed by the zoological collection and the museum in housing the samples,
specimens and skulls upon which European knowledge across botany, zoology,
anatomy, geology and anthropology was, in part, constructed. During the eight-
eenth century natural history, and speciﬁcally botany, emerged at the forefront of
new classiﬁcatory methods in the construction of comprehensive scientiﬁc knowl-
edge. Attempts to produce comprehensive and systematic, ordered knowledge of
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the natural world entailed naming and deﬁning types, so as to introduce order to the
inﬁnite diversity of plants and animals.21 Such was the life-work of the Swedish
botanist Carl Linneaus, who is acknowledged as having pioneered a new
method of classiﬁcation. Linnaeus’s system of classiﬁcation and ordering, his tax-
onomy, was based on analysing and comparing visible aspects of natural beings,
and constructed by assembling and naming the many types in an ordered hierarchy
(classes, orders, genera, species and varieties) on the basis of shared or divergent
visible attributes (similarities and differences).22
The classiﬁcation of human varieties was undertaken in the context of these
developments in natural history, within botany and later anatomy. That is, the
methods developed for the study of the natural world were seamlessly applied
also to the classiﬁcation of humans into distinct groups or varieties. Linneaus is
widely acknowledged as one of the ﬁrst to categorize peoples in terms of a discrete
number of races, although efforts to identify distinct human groups using the terms
‘race’ and ‘species’ had been undertaken during the seventeenth century, notably
by the French traveller, philosopher and physician François Bernier in his Nouvelle
division de la Terre, par les différentes Espèces ou Races d’hommes qui l’habitent
published in 1684.23 Linneaus was, however, the ﬁrst to position humans within an
overall scientiﬁc classiﬁcation of animals and plants.24 In his major work of taxon-
omy Systema Naturae (ﬁrst published 1735, with numerous subsequent editions),
in which he sought to classify the whole of the natural world, Linneaus identiﬁed
four varieties of human: Europaeus albus, Americanus rubescens, Asiaticus fuscus
and Africanus niger.25
The contemporary and subsequent elaboration of the notion of race and racial
classiﬁcations within scientiﬁc and philosophical discourse during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries both drew on and reacted against the scheme and
methods of Linneaus. His student Blumenbach later elaborated a scheme specify-
ing ﬁve rather than four varieties; his rival and critic Buffon26 rejected the bota-
nist’s static scheme as arbitrary and artiﬁcial, and proposed instead an
understanding of racial characteristics inherited over time.27 Kant, Bernasconi
has documented, expended considerable energy in the 1770s–1780s elaborating
the concept of race and describing the characteristics of different races, and his
works were very much informed by Buffon’s critique of Linneaus’s method.28
And if, in the nineteenth century, within racial science as such these static classi-
ﬁcatory methods were superseded by theories of evolution underpinned by a tem-
poral conception of change,29 they were employed by Victorian anthropologists
and ethnologists in their constructions of taxonomies of human societies in a hier-
archy of civilization, whether static or evolutionary, whether the work of physical
anthropologists measuring skulls or of social anthropologists categorizing tribes
and cultural systems.30 While methods of classiﬁcation differed, they shared under-
lying epistemological presuppositions regarding the production of authoritative
scientiﬁc knowledge.31 Entities were deﬁned and distinguished on the basis of
similarities and differences between visible or empirical characteristics. The
relations between types were characteristically displayed or illustrated in the
form of tables and diagrams; indeed Foucault has argued that the ‘centre of knowl-
edge, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the table’.32
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The logic of classiﬁcation was not only central to the early articulation of a
scientiﬁc discourse of race, but was also integral to various modes of government
which produced racialized social and international orders—as Barnor Hesse has
argued, ‘epistemological racialisation’ is inherently related to ‘governmental racia-
lisation’.33 Classiﬁcation of people according to a racial hierarchy was integral to
legal governance in the slave-based societies of the Caribbean, North and South
America from the seventeenth century, the United States in the nineteenth
century, and Apartheid South Africa and Australia in the twentieth century.34
Classiﬁcation of societies and peoples on a scale of ‘civilisation’, on the basis of
anthropological knowledge, was from the mid-nineteenth century integral to posi-
tivist international law regulating colonial conquest, as well as doctrines legitimiz-
ing colonial governance and dispossession.35
Of course the purpose and context of classiﬁcatory analysis in racial thought,
and in critical analysis of racial thought, differ radically and fundamentally. Yet
there might be some unintended consequences of this analytical approach for
Hobson’s project. What is gained in analytical clarity and precision perhaps
comes at the expense of a clear sense of the political stakes underpinning
Hobson’s critique.
Isabelle Charmantier has provided a fascinating discussion of the role of visual
representation in Linnaeus’s work.36 She emphasizes that practices of organizing
information in a visual form were central to both his method of enquiry and the
presentation of his analysis. Linnaeus drew on methods acquired from his edu-
cation to develop a peculiarly visual mode of thought, which constituted ‘an essen-
tial part of Linnaeus’s attempts to bring order to an ever-increasing amount of data
about the natural world’.37 These methods derived from the Ramist ‘commonpla-
cing’ traditions which emphasized the use of tables, diagrams and lists and the
methodical ordering of copied notes to assist learning.38 Linnaeus used analytical
and naturalistic drawings as an analytical tool to convey structural information
about plants, and maps, tables and diagrams to structure both the process of analy-
sis and the representation of large quantities of information. He sought to classify
the inﬁnite variety of beings in the natural world, and tables and diagrams enabled
the summary display of these classiﬁcations. He also employed these methods to
organize his study of the classiﬁcations of other naturalists, using ‘dichotomous
diagrams’, a central feature of the Ramist method used widely in natural history,
to summarize and organize his analysis of the works of others. These diagrams
offered ‘quickly and easily understood outlines of complex subjects’, and were
accompanied by ‘a concern for conciseness in vocabulary used, an emphasis on
relevant differences’.39
Charmantier comments that the use of these methods to facilitate the ambition of
arranging complex information in a clear format on the space of a page often
involved some form of ‘ﬂattening’. His drawings ‘are often ﬂattened: foreshorten-
ing and perspective are eschewed in preference to displaying information as plainly
as possible’. Drawings, maps, tables and diagrams formed part of a visual analyti-
cal language or method, ‘ﬂattened on the page in order to convey as much infor-
mation as possible in a visually striking way’.40 Linnaeus’s tables were usually
contained on one page or at most a double-spread, which enabled him ‘to
contain the information in a restricted paper space, and to limit it to a manageable
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length’.41 What she refers to as the ‘alliance of a diagram and a table’ underpinned
his display of information in his Systema Naturae:
a diagram for the main tenets—the key—and a table going into more details. … In effect, the
page acts as a kind of box: the table is a contained whole, enclosed by lines and ﬁlled with
boxes within boxes at every level: class, order, and ﬁnally genus.42
These visual tools were also important in the actual working out of his classiﬁ-
cations: ‘The arrangement of data into diagrams or tables helped Linnaeus to think
about the relationships between genera or, at a higher level, of orders and classes,
to organize them in space, and to ﬁnd adequate means of classifying them.’ The
written text in his books was arranged according to a methodical, spatial or
visual logic, mirroring in the organization of paragraphs the structural features
of the plant he was analysing.43
Hobson also makes considerable use of tables and diagrams to map the complex-
ity of the thought he addresses, clarifying his distinctions between positions with
regard to similarities and differences. At times this results in a four-fold or more
complex scheme, elsewhere the chronological development of different ideas are
mapped. This has the effect of rendering on the same plane quite different
strands of thought at different times and contexts, summarizing in a concise
manner the similarities and differences between a wide array of works. The
overall classiﬁcatory scheme, as described in the book’s introduction, structures
the ordering of the analysis in the book’s parts, chapters and chapter sub-sections.
This enables the coherent and systematic presentation and analysis of ‘a vast
swathe’44 of primary texts and intellectual approaches. Nevertheless, this
method also carries certain risks, insofar as effects of the analytical method are
imposed sometimes through and sometimes alongside and in spite of Hobson’s
own discussion. The result, perhaps analogous to Charmantier’s comments on Lin-
naeus’s method, is a curious ﬂattening out of the political stakes informing this
project. I will try to illustrate what I mean with two examples.
In the early part of the book, readers might ﬁnd surprising and perplexing some
of the conclusions or evaluations made which arise from the classiﬁcatory method
and the attendant strong attention to distinguishing ‘racist’ from other forms of
‘eurocentric’ thought. For example Hobson examines the works of Norman
Angell, noting that despite his location within IR’s imagined genealogy at the
‘climax of liberal internationalism’, his views constituted a form of paternalist
eurocentrism and progressive evolutionism which informed a qualiﬁed support
for imperialism.45 Angell’s argument for interdependence in The Great Illusion
(1913) referred only to the ‘civilized’ states of Europe. He supported imperial con-
quest and control over various non-European societies on the grounds that the civi-
lizing mission would enable ‘race conservation’ and ‘the survival of the unﬁt’,
arguing that the ‘inferior race’ in India ‘not only survives, but is given an extra
lease of life by virtue of the conquest’.46 Hobson underlines that unlike some of
his contemporaries Angell supported a ‘benign and peaceful imperialism’47 such
as that of Britain, whose methods were ‘commercial and peaceful’, in contrast to
what Angell terms the military processes and methods of Spain, Portugal and
France.48 Angell supported England’s ‘work of policing backward or disorderly
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populations’ in India and elsewhere, on the grounds of the superior qualities of the
English.49 Hobson cites the following passage from Angell’s book:
Not that Fuzzy Wuzzy is not a ﬁne fellow. He is manly, sturdy, hardy, with a courage, and
warlike qualities generally, which no European can equal. But the frail and spectacled
English ofﬁcial is his master, and a few score of such will make themselves the masters of
teeming thousands of Sudanese; the relatively unwarlike Englishman is doing the same
thing all over Asia, and he is doing it simply by virtue of superior brain and character,
more thought, more rationalism, more steady and controlled hard work… Force is indeed
the master, but it is the force of intelligence, and rationalism.50
Hobson certainly does IR a service in revealing such views held by a key ﬁgure of
the discipline’s tradition of liberal internationalism. Yet according to his criteria of
classiﬁcation Angell represents a paternalist eurocentric institutionalism. Speciﬁ-
cally, Hobson rejects ‘the claim that Angell’s book was racist’.51 An analytical
and comparative classiﬁcatory method which leads to this conclusion52 seems dif-
ﬁcult to comprehend. Hobson’s distinction between ‘eurocentric institutionalism’
and ‘scientiﬁc racism’ seems to restrict the identiﬁcation of ‘racist’ thought strictly
to ideas which upheld solely a biological or genetic view of race, including but not
limited to eugenics, leaving much of what many would consider evidently racia-
lized thought to the category of ‘eurocentric institutionalism’. It appears also
that at times the use of these terms to categorize strands of thought is conﬂated
with an assumption that to do so is to criticize, accuse or ‘smear’ a particular
author with the charge of being ‘racist’.53 It is for this very reason that many scho-
lars use the term racialized or racial thought in the critique of thought from pre-
vious centuries.54
The later parts of the book (parts III and IV) analyse the continuing eurocentrism
of international theory across several strands of the discipline in the post-1945 era
up to the present. These chapters provide a detailed dissection of a succession of
approaches and authors—classical realism, neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism,
the English school, neo-Gramscian scholarship, World Systems Theory, and ﬁnally
post-1989 ‘western realism’ and ‘western liberalism’. Much of this critique is con-
vincing, warranted and important. However, the very use of classiﬁcatory terminol-
ogy and comparative method which is intended to enable important distinctions
between these various works has the effect of positioning widely divergent
approaches with quite different political motivations and implications on the
same plane of analysis, such that it becomes quite difﬁcult to grasp the stakes of
the critique—that is, the differing stakes of the various types of problem being
identiﬁed within this over-arching typology or taxonomy of eurocentric thought.
In Chapter 10 under the category of ‘Critical Subliminal Eurocentrism’ Hobson
examines World Systems Theory through the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, and
Neo-Gramscian thought through the work of Robert Cox, as the two main forms of
neo-Marxist IR. He argues that these approaches ‘(re)appear as minor variations on
a consistent anti-paternalist Eurocentric theme’.55 In both cases Hobson reveals
forms of eurocentrism underpinning their historical analyses of the development
of global capitalism, which assumes a process of endogenous development
taking place within Europe and then spreading outwards to the rest of the world,
and ignores or denies altogether any capacity for ‘agency’ on the part of non-
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Western societies. One consequence of this, Hobson argues, is to naturalize the
relations of capitalism and Western domination. Thus Cox’s work, Hobson con-
cludes, instead of performing the work of critical theory in denaturalizing the
present, actually becomes a form of ahistorical ‘problem-solving theory’ which
generates ‘albeit unwittingly, a defence of the Western interest in general and the
American interest in particular’.56 The next chapter turns to various strands of
post-1989 ‘Western realism’, including the work of Samuel Huntington, Michael
Ignatieff, Robert Kaplan, Niall Ferguson and others. Through detailed examination
of the logic, substance and vocabulary of their works, Hobson elaborates the
important argument that, for this form of ‘Western neo-imperialist international
theory’, ‘non-Western polities are not recognized as sovereign if their instability
poses a clear and present danger to western states’, a position which is ‘congruent
with the imperialist discourse of the standard of civilization/standard of
statehood’.57
Thus the analysis and critique of ‘Critical Subliminal Eurocentrism’ and
‘Imperialist Eurocentrism’ in these two chapters is quite different, and matters in
very different ways. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the detail in the successive sec-
tions of analysis, placing these various approaches on the same ultimate terrain of
eurocentrism leaves the reader with the impression that they suffer from the same
problems, all ultimately defending the interests of the West. While the racialized
tone and logic of analyses of ‘failed states’ comes through clearly despite the
narrow deﬁnition of ‘racism’ employed in the book, Hobson actively imposes a
racialized vocabulary onto neo-Gramscian and World Systems scholarship where
it does not exist. In his opening diagram of Chapter 10 and within the text, the argu-
ment that these approaches, due to their underlying eurocentrism, fetishize the
agency of the West and ignore that of the rest through a subliminal three-worlds
hierarchy is articulated by indicating that this reproduces categories of civilized,
barbaric, savage and primitive. Here, the logic of comparison imposes a racialized
terminology on the work Cox and Wallerstein which is not warranted. More gen-
erally, within this comparative classiﬁcatory method, important political distinc-
tions between neo-Gramscian scholarship and that of advocates of neo-
trusteeship seem to get lost. It is the analytical method of comparison and classi-
ﬁcation which ﬂattens out the critique, making it difﬁcult to grasp a sense of the
very different political stakes of these approaches. The eurocentrism of progressive
critical scholars on the left is a problem,58 but of a very different kind to that of neo-
conservative scholars advocating new forms of imperial trusteeship.
The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics is a major piece of scholarship
and an important contribution to the discipline of IR and well beyond. Hobson
is right to underline the centrality, complexity and contradictions of racial dis-
course and eurocentrism within international thought, and the diversity of political
positions correlating with distinct ideas about race or with underlying eurocentric
assumptions. His book irrefutably demonstrates that racial and eurocentric thought
was not merely coincidental with but constitutive of the discipline of IR. Para-
phrasing Mudimbe’s comment on anthropology, Hobson conﬁrms that racial and
eurocentric discourse ‘is not, as some scholars thought, an unfortunate mishap,
nor a stupid accident, but one of the major signs of possibility’ of the discipline.
In addition, and inadvertently, his analysis serves to caution us to the political
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effects of international thought’s methodological devices as well as its explicit
content.
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